Before beginning,
it is important to recognize that these episodes aLso touch on rather deep ethical questions. One can and should aak about the propriety of wrifng and runn/ng a program that has no eemmaefive purpcae, or even _ pitring mudl investor, against mature imtitutiom armed with supercompum's.
PersonaUy, I feel that the nmning a worm thows a deplorable Lack of judgement, and entertain some doubts about the modern stock market. Nonethelem, these concluaiom are debatable, and strt_ly dependent on questiom of taste.
The present discussion focuses on a more technical ia_e, namely the mbusmeu of diatributed computing syster_ --agaimt intrmiom, but aim ha the pre_ of evenla that arise commo_y in _stributed tettin8_ , _ch as failurm and overloads. Became these i._,_es are basicaJly technical, one can hope to arrive at a more or lest technical answen to them. To the extent that these lead back to philmophicad speculadom, the queafom raised concern impficatiom of more technical conclusiora, and hence one might hope that they will be lem conm_ertial than i The pna$ram wal deas_xi to lametrate a. many machi:_ as pemible usin_ hap and toog_lm in 
Predicting the behavior of a ted system
Consider the problem of predicting how a distributed system wiLl behave while it is executing. Such a system will be made up of large numbers of components, It iastrikingthat whereas the worm provoked much discussionof distributed systems security, and some attention was been given to d_ ethic_ h'npticadons of nmnmg such a program, rather tit'tle was paid to the broader isaue of winch the worm was just a manifestation.
Many sy3team C.an one really build a large distributed system that is su/_iciendy robust to entrmt it to perform such a crticad taak? Based on the arguments that I will advance below, I chink the answer is a negative one. It seems to me that there is an applicable "impomibility" rmuit;
a_,umema seem to apply in many other settings. To establish this, however, one must first ask how robust a dbm-_buted system can reasonably be expected to be.
In the case of more mature technologies, such as cramportadon and power generation, organizadom exist to ez-xa_ the safety of systenu that enter widespread use. The meaam_ rna_ated in some areas are a.storksbJ_ in their about human potendad for error and for assuming that tmIikely events will not only occur, but will do so at the worst possible time.
For example, nuclear reactors incorporate the meat extreme meuures to minimize risk. This has clearly reduced the potential for ciisaste_. Yet, incidents continue to occur, and in many cases the ways in which they oct,at raiae new q_stiora about the whole assumption that systems of this sort can evea' be made safe.
In contrast, the engineering oE even the moat widdy used dist_1_ated systems has been fairly informal If tr-a/m crash and nuclear "excursions" (leaks) occur despite every countermeasure that designers with yeass of experience have
with only minimal attention co robmmem?
The mzet common form of reg_ation for distributed systerna has been through low-Level standards, aa for the I$O data tramport protocols. Howevea', the probkam identified above arise at the application level, and co the extent that appLicatiom-level _andarch have been developed, they have been premature and ovea'ly reatrictive. Clearly, one cannot define a standard for aspecta of a system that are still experimental.
Yet, it seems eqmdly dear that ignoring these issues only encourages the consu'uction of complex, fragile software.
Principles foe di.m'ibuted computing
One thing that we tack is a set of guiding prineiplm to encourage the developmerit of sound solutiom to distributed computing problem. Let me propcae a setof such principles now.
Throe who produce di_eributed computing mftware d'axakJ make every effort to emm_ that the software ia safe for its intended mode of use and that it can only be used in the intended way. At.d, we must accept our rmpomibility to apply the highest gataiards of ethical behavior in our individual research and to these standards in our students and colleagues.
System
should be interconnected to _hieve concrete objectives, not in the ahatract belief that intere.onnection is a good thing. System that are incapable of interacting are incapable of compromising one another.
SuAOor_onlyntcessar X ser_s.
When systems are interconnected, the default should be co support the smallest pcmible set of services.
Services should be enabled _electively and because there is a good reason to support chem. This minimizes the probability that a loophole in the large (and ever increasing)set ca"communication services could have widespread consequences. Also, it makes it more likelythat the services that are enabled will be properly maintained. 
failures.
To avoid such problerm one must either deaign substantial excess capacity into a system (which is often too costly to be practical) or detect overload and react by invoking load-shedding mechanisms.
The latter approach is familiar from telephone systems.
Avo_ uamg "n=_' msotan/m_.
When a large system is built out of large numhen of interacting components, the superficially simple algorithms they embody can misbehave in =urpfiKng ways. Thi= poaes spodal problems to the desJgnm of _buted systems, where it is often ditticult to predict exacdy how a mechaniam will behave under real loads.
For example, there is a strong temptation to include schedu_g heur_ca and adaptive mechanisms in low levels of a system; my group did this in some parts the ISIS system for purpoaes of load balancing.
Yet, short of acc_-ateiy modeling a system, there is no way to know i/" local opdmization decifiom will yield globally good behavior, or simply cause the system to "thrash". Given the choice, a simple, well-underwood mechanism is always prderable to a fancier but poorly undeamood one.
Furore directions
The pfi.ndples enumerated above raise a tremendous number of queadom about current and fiature distributed _r_ten'=. It is intereging to examine some of the application areaa that were covered in the text in this light.
Scaling and adminim'adon of Kle systems.
The major focm d recent work on distributed file sy_erm has been on perfor- My reasoning is that if operating systerra Lack support for the sorts of mechanisms needed ha application software, those appllcatiom either will not get built, will be built using less than ideal methods or will be forced to individually reproduce the miuing mechanisms. Moreover, security and trust comidera. tiom would limit the composition of large systems out of smaller components: it will be too hard to agree on protocol specifications and implementation details.
It is clear that a substantial number of applications will need replication.
Given this situation, it seems that one would be better off providing such services in a standard way. If individual application builders are asked to take on an effort of this scale, a large amount of duplicated effort will surely result, leading to application software that is less robust, less portable, and harder to maintain than desired. 
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